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Tuesday, March 2, 2010
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California Law: No state law immunity for false claim brought pursuant to Cal. Gov. Code § 815.6
The Case: Sullivan v. County of L.A., 12 Cal.3d 710 (1974)
Held: Neither "the immunity afforded by California Government Code § 821.6, nor that provided by any other state governmental immunity provision, applies to a false imprisonment claim brought pursuant to California Government Code § 815.6."
The Reasoning: "California law is also clear that qualified immunity does not apply to state civil rights claims. See id. at 753 (holding that "qualified immunity of the kind applied to actions brought under 42[U.S.C. § ] 1983 does not apply to actions brought under [the Bane Act]"). In other words, qualified immunity is a doctrine of federal common law and, as such, has no application to Cousins' state claims, which are subject only to state statutory immunities. See Asgari, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 842, 937 P.2d at 280 (noting that "[g]overnmental immunity for claims of violation of civil rights under section 1983 is not conferred expressly by statute, but is based upon a judicial gloss on section 1983," whereas "governmental immunity under California law is governed by statute")."Ogborn v. City of Lancaster, 101 Cal.App.4th 448, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 238, 246 (2002))
full post test
Sunday, May 17, 2009
The Case: Jennings v. City of Stillwater, 383 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2004)
In a "backwards looking" denial of access to the court action, the complaint must "identify a remedy that may be awarded as recompense but not otherwise available in some suit that may yet be brought."Background: Allison Jennings, the plaintiff, a Oklahoma State University (OSU) student, filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 civil rights lawsuit against four OSU football players accused of raping her, and against members of the Stillwater Oklahoma Police Department for failing to collect material evidence, failing to challenge the football players' account of the events, discouraging Plaintiff from prosecuting the football players in violation of state and federal law, and finally, causing the physical evidence from the alleged rape to be destroyed, making it difficult to maintain a civil action against the football players.
The lawsuits were severed, and proceed against each group of defendants under different legal theories.
The suit against the football players and OSU had been settled out of court, with a stipulation that the settlement amount remains confidential.
The suit against detective Buzzard proceeded to trial where the district court granted summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity as to the defendants on all claims. The Circuit Court affirmed.
On appeal, the Jennings court treated the issue as a "backwards looking" denial of access to the court, and found that the underlying complaint failed to meet the pleading requirements for backward looking claims established in Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403.
More specifically, according to Harbury, a backwards looking denial of access to the court complaint must "identify a remedy that may be awarded as recompense but not otherwise available in some suit that may yet be brought." Id at 415.
In Jennings, the only remedy that could conceivably be awarded to Plaintiff as a result of the alleged police misconduct would be damages for the loss of her civil tort claim against the assailants; but this is precisely the same element of damage she sought and obtained in her suit against the four football players and OSU.
In other words, Plaintiff pursued her claims and reached a monetary settlement with the four football players and OSU. She thus had access to the courts, and obtained a remedy.
The basis for affirming summary judgment: The plaintiff did not specifically alleged, or presented evidence, that the settlement amount was inadequate on account of the government's actions so as to deny her meaningful relief.
While several points in her appellate briefs did allude to such a claim. (References omitted), her complaint contains no such allegation, and the record contains no evidence on the point. And, in light of the confidentiality of Plaintiff's settlement, there is no way such a claim could be evaluated.
CASES CITED BY THE JENNINGS COURT RE: DENIAL OF ACCESS TO THE COURT
* Wilson v. Meeks, (10th Cir.1995)
* Foster v. City of Lake Jackson, 28 F.3d 425, 430 (5th Cir.1994)
* Bell v. Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1261 (7th Cir.1984)
* Ryland v. Shapiro, 708 F.2d 967, 971-73 (5th Cir.1983)
* Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403 (2002)
NOTE: The Court cites Wilson v. Meeks, suggesting that denial of access to the court claims in the 10th Cir. does not include interference with discovery, but is limited to actions that interfere with the filing of the complaint. This is the case in the 5th Circuit (Foster v. City of Lake Jackson, citing Ryland v. Shapiro)
Parallel Case: Broudy, Alice P. vs. Mather, Susan H. - U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Cir. - August 23, 2006, Federal Circuits, Docket 05-5085:
Read more...
Accural of Statute of Limitations in civil rights/false arrest since Heck v. Humphrey
Wednesday, May 6, 2009
Accrual of Claims:
The Case: Wallace v. Kato 127 S. Ct. 1091 (2007)
More specifically, does Heck v. Humphrey
In this context, the court pointed out that false arrest is a distinct tort, as is malicious prosecution, where the latter requires a judgment overturning a conviction, and the former does not.
At this point the court considered when the "wrongful conduct or omission result in damages" from a false arrest/imprisonment.
And concludes: "false imprisonment consists of detention without legal process, a false imprisonment ends once the victim becomes held pursuant to such process..."
Therefore... Read more...
The Case: Wallace v. Kato 127 S. Ct. 1091 (2007)
The Question: When does a cause of action accrue for false arrest in a civil rights lawsuit under 42 USC 1983. In this case, where a court of appeal reversed on technical grounds and remands for a new trial, which the prosecution did not pursue ?
More specifically, does Heck v. Humphrey
First, the (Wallace) court states, "While we have never stated so expressly, the accrual date of a §1983 cause of action is a question of federal law that is not resolved by reference to state law."
As such the Court found that the traditional rule of accrual apply. That is to say that the "tort cause of action accrues, and the statute of limitations commences to run, when the wrongful act or omission results in damages. "
In this context, the court pointed out that false arrest is a distinct tort, as is malicious prosecution, where the latter requires a judgment overturning a conviction, and the former does not.
At this point the court considered when the "wrongful conduct or omission result in damages" from a false arrest/imprisonment.
And concludes: "false imprisonment consists of detention without legal process, a false imprisonment ends once the victim becomes held pursuant to such process..."
Therefore... Read more...
Equitable tolling under 42 USC 1985
Sunday, May 3, 2009
A review of cases of interest
In 42 U.S.C. 1985, subd(a), relating to "Proceedings in vindication of civil rights", states..., including procedings under 42 U.S.C. 1983, and 1987.
"The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district courts ... for the protection of all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and for their vindication, shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of the United States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all cases where they are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against law, the common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be extended to and govern the said courts in the trial and disposition of the cause, and, if it is of a criminal nature, in the infliction of punishment on the party found guilty."
RE "borrowing" state Statute of Limiations under 42 USC 1988
Tuesday, April 28, 2009
Board of Regents of Univ. of State of N. Y. v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478 (1980)
"Under 42 U.S.C. 1988, federal courts are instructed to refer to state statutes when federal law provides no rule of decision for actions brought under 1983, and 1988 authorizes federal courts to disregard an otherwise applicable state rule of law only if the state law is "inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States."
Since Congress did not establish a statute of limitations or a body of tolling rules applicable to federal-court actions under 1983, the analogous state statute of limitations and the coordinate tolling rules are binding rules of law in most cases. This "borrowing" of the state statute of limitations includes rules of tolling unless they are "inconsistent" with federal law."
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